Suez 1956 The Crisis and Its Consequences Clarendon Paperbacks

This is an analysis based on newly available evidence of the Suez crisis of 1956 its origins and its consequences. The contributors are all leading authorities and some were active participants in the events of 1956 offering personal reflection as well as an assessment of the decisions that were made. The opening chapters trace the origins of the crisis from the British occupation of Egypt the failure to resolve the problem of Palestine and the Baghdad Pact of 1955 which divided the Middle East into two opposing camps. Part Two deals with the crisis itself before and during the invasion of Egypt by British French and Israeli troops in November 1956. What type of regime did the British hope to install in place of Nasser's? Why did the invasion come to an abrupt and humiliating halt? Why did the American government insist on the withdrawal of these troops? These questions are among the issues discussed in the third part of the book which also deals with the impact of the crisis on French and British decolonization the 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States de Gaulle's reaction to the 'Anglo-Saxons' and the legacy of Nasser's influence in the Middle East today. Of the contributors who were personally involved at the time of the crisis Amin Hewedy was on the Egyptian General Staff; Mordechai Bar-On was Ben-Gurion's aide-de-camp; Robert Bowie was United States Assistant Secretary of State; and Adam Watson was head of the African Department of the British Foreign Office. A conclusion by Albert Hourani offers systematic answers to questions raised throughout the book. CONTRIBUTORS: Mordechai Bar-On Hebrew University Jerusalem Lord Beloff All Souls College Oxford Robert R. Bowie Harvard University John C. Campbell former Deputy Director of Eastern European Affairs and on the Policy Planning Staff of the US State Department Ali E. Hillal Dessouki Cairo University Howard Dooley Western Michigan University Hermann Eilts Boston University Michael Fry University of Southern California Sarvepalli Gopal Jawahrlal Nehru University New Delhi Amin Hewedy Cairo University was Political Counsellor to President Nasser Albert Hourani St Antony's College Oxford J. C. Hurewitz Colombia University Rashid I. Kalidi University of Chicago Diane B. Kunz Yale University Keith Kyle Royal Institute of International Affairs London Wm. Roger Louis University of Texas Peter Lyon University of London J. D. B. Miller Australian National University Roger Owen St Antony's College Oxford Shimon Shamir Tel Aviv University Maurice Vaisse University of Rheims Adam Watson University of Virginia

This is an analysis based on newly available evidence of the Suez crisis of 1956 its origins and its consequences. The contributors are all leading authorities and some were active participants in the events of 1956 offering personal reflection as well as an assessment of the decisions that were made. The opening chapters trace the origins of the crisis from the British occupation of Egypt the failure to resolve the problem of Palestine and the Baghdad Pact of 1955 which divided the Middle East into two opposing camps. Part Two deals with the crisis itself before and during the invasion of Egypt by British French and Israeli troops in November 1956. What type of regime did the British hope to install in place of Nasser's? Why did the invasion come to an abrupt and humiliating halt? Why did the American government insist on the withdrawal of these troops? These questions are among the issues discussed in the third part of the book which also deals with the impact of the crisis on French and British decolonization the 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States de Gaulle's reaction to the 'Anglo-Saxons' and the legacy of Nasser's influence in the Middle East today. Of the contributors who were personally involved at the time of the crisis Amin Hewedy was on the Egyptian General Staff; Mordechai Bar-On was Ben-Gurion's aide-de-camp; Robert Bowie was United States Assistant Secretary of State; and Adam Watson was head of the African Department of the British Foreign Office. A conclusion by Albert Hourani offers systematic answers to questions raised throughout the book. CONTRIBUTORS: Mordechai Bar-On Hebrew University Jerusalem Lord Beloff All Souls College Oxford Robert R. Bowie Harvard University John C. Campbell former Deputy Director of Eastern European Affairs and on the Policy Planning Staff of the US State Department Ali E. Hillal Dessouki Cairo University Howard Dooley Western Michigan University Hermann Eilts Boston University Michael Fry University of Southern California Sarvepalli Gopal Jawahrlal Nehru University New Delhi Amin Hewedy Cairo University was Political Counsellor to President Nasser Albert Hourani St Antony's College Oxford J. C. Hurewitz Colombia University Rashid I. Kalidi University of Chicago Diane B. Kunz Yale University Keith Kyle Royal Institute of International Affairs London Wm. Roger Louis University of Texas Peter Lyon University of London J. D. B. Miller Australian National University Roger Owen St Antony's College Oxford Shimon Shamir Tel Aviv University Maurice Vaisse University of Rheims Adam Watson University of Virginia

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• ISBN Suez 1956 ( The Crisis and its Consequences ) book English Paperback 446 pages
• ISBN Suez 1956 ( The Crisis and its Consequences ) book English Paperback 446 pages